A lecture Olaf Stapledon first gave to the University Staff Discussion Club on 27 October 1938 — weeks after Munich — used again at least twice that winter, and took up once more after the war with two fresh opening sheets headed "Future of Britain 1946". The manuscript is two witnesses in one folder, and this essay keeps them apart, marked where each begins. The argument, structure, and emphases follow the notes sheet by sheet; the prose is editorial — connective sentences and asides in his manner that the notes do not contain. For exactly what is his, word for word, see the source-bounded reading edition; for his notes beside the reconstructed prose, the side-by-side reconstruction. One frame-note: the project's lecture concordance reads this set, its March 1938 sibling, and the 1944 Sheffield lecture as exhibits of a "platform bifurcation" — a public, secular, humanist Stapledon speaking in parallel with the private superhumanist one. That observation belongs to this frame, not to the argument below.
Signs of eclipse (1938)
I want to speak about the future of Britain — meaning this island and its people, not British imperialism. And this is merely a layman's view: a synopsis for discussion.
Britain's past: she was a pioneer of nationalism, of democracy, of industrialism. She developed commercial imperialism; but she also made experiments in social betterment. She became the mother of parliaments, the workshop of the world and, less creditably, the usurer of the world.
Look, then, at Britain today — post-Munich. The first fact is economic decline. We have lost trade to the United States, Germany and Japan. The backward lands, once our markets, have themselves industrialized. We have been more interested in the income from investments than in adapting our productive system. Productive power tends to stagnate; slumps and unemployment recur.
We have also lost our lead in social betterment — partly through economic decline, partly through sheer lassitude; one thinks of the ships. There has been no serious attempt to tackle the health of the people. Our stamina has been undermined by long industrialism — Montague has called attention to it.
Meanwhile the Empire has become undefendable. Potential German power must be reckoned with, and there is Indian unrest. Germany, Italy and Japan threaten the imperial system. Imperial pride imposes a rising cost just as our capacity to bear it declines. And there is what one may rudely call the decay of the Sahib: in Egypt, Palestine and India the old automatic prestige of the British ruler no longer works.
England herself has acquired a terrifying vulnerability. London can be destroyed. An air blockade may bring starvation to a country so dependent on imported food. And we have lost prestige abroad, largely through post-war diplomacy: Britain does not count, people say; insincere idealism and stupid self-seeking; "decadence" — though that, I think, is not quite the right diagnosis.
At home, meanwhile, authoritarianism increases. Parliament is ignored. There has been police aggression and secret governmental interference — the Sandys affair, the Vernon case. What we are seeing is the dead hand of oligarchy, not any mysterious decadence of the British people. The bourgeoisie has lost its grip.
Hence the widespread lassitude: chaos in politics; democracy suspect; a craving for leadership; apathy and defeatism. All the signs of eclipse.
[Editorial note: here the manuscript changes decade. The next two sheets are the second witness — a fresh opening headed "Future of Britain 1946", for a post-war reuse. The 1938 sequence resumes at "Britain's assets".]
The record and the prospect (1946)
Looking at the matter again in 1946, after the war, we must begin by doing justice to our record: our literature and poetry; our political institutions and the English spirit; our industry, our Empire, the Battle of Britain.
Our past was shaped by special circumstances: island security; prosperity, and the bourgeoisie it created; the fight for democracy; liberal, commercial individualism; the Labour Movement; the workshop of the world; the Pax Britannica.
But our prospect is wholly different: lost industrial supremacy, lost imperial supremacy, lost naval domination. We have lost our "foreign securities." We have even lost our arrogance. We are no longer a great power. We stand between Russia and America, and we must ask whether we are not overstraining ourselves in the attempt to remain one.
Our dependence on foreign food remains; our population is tired and ageing. Capitalism has failed to prevent slumps, and the threat of unemployment has not vanished. We need to plan and to nationalize — and must do it at an unfavourable time; moreover, we are financially involved with the United States.
There are, broadly, two courses before us. We may try once more to triumph in power politics while retaining the structure of "private enterprise". Or we may undertake a profound change — of aims, of structure, of politics.
A new hope for Britain (1946)
What do we really want? Not imperialism; not economic dominance; but a full life for all the people of this island — the fullest possible human development. In Blake's phrase, Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land.
What can we give the world? First, high-grade goods. Secondly, an example of social democracy achieved without blood-letting. Thirdly, the spirit of mutual forbearance and give-and-take — precisely what the world most needs. Our special task may be to unite the good of liberalism with the good of communism — a liaison between Russia and America.
Our first concern, however, must be Europe: to help revive her economically and culturally, combining Europe's own great tradition with the novelties of Russia and America. Should this take the form of a federal Europe? Perhaps; but certainly not a Europe organized against Russia. A revived Europe might have two foci, Britain and France — though we must admit that France is sick. There are also the northern democracies: liberal at heart, yet forced increasingly to socialize their economic life. Hence what I should call liberal communism.
The movement may be described dialectically. Thesis: liberal, commercialist individualism. Antithesis: collectivism — a good form in Russia, a bad form in Germany. The required synthesis is a Western liberal communism: neither isolated individualism nor herd-subordination, but personality-in-community — the individual cherished as an individual, yet flourishing only in a just and vigorous community.
Questions standing over
[Editorial note: the verso of the second 1946 sheet carries heavily abbreviated jottings — supplementary heads, assignable to neither layer.]
Several further questions I can do no more than place before you. One is the balance of age in the population, and emigration. What of Britain and Germany? Of Russian power politics? Of federation with the United States?
Can Britain become a model state while her population is declining? If so, there is the question of the best class and, above all, of the education of the masses.
We must also ask whether the modern state is to be a pagan state, and what then becomes of Christianity. The Christians must convert — Buddhism. A community requires some common object of loyalty. Nationalism has been made to serve — one thinks of the S.P., and of Abyssinia.
Is democracy merely the ideal form of government for a naturally governing class? Must society acknowledge a supreme deity — and does that imply universal suffrage? Then there is Russia.
Germany raises the old problem of empire. Empires do not contribute most at their peak. Finally there is the problem of leisure.
Britain's assets, and two possible futures (1938)
[Editorial note: here the notes return to the 1938 sequence — its page 2, the timing marks resuming down the margins.]
Before we despair, take stock of Britain's main assets: machinery, plant and minerals; a great body of skill. More important than any of these is our political and moral tradition: respect for individuality, kindliness, the habit of give-and-take and compromise. That tradition is very strong, and it may make all the difference. But it is not indestructible.
Britain's problem today is that radically new circumstances demand radically new aims and new habits of thought and feeling. Our task is to get the policy clear and then propagate the feeling without which it cannot be carried out — a new kind of patriotism. If we fail, the result will be disaster.
There are two possible futures. The first is automatism: business as usual, an unimaginative continuation of old tendencies. The second is conscious reorientation — what I shall call Britain Born Again.
Automatism means orthodox imperialism — tariff walls and armaments — combined with orthodox capitalism. It means continued exploitation of Africa and of British workers. It means gruelling rearmament and the decay of social services. Education would become education for discipline; police rule would grow, and free thought would come to an end. This course leads toward imperial war with Germany, Italy and Japan — to defeat and ruin; and at the last, Britain a Nazi dependency, with no freedom left to us.
The alternative is Britain born again. But such a policy has prerequisites. One is the pressure of circumstances — the effects of Munich, for example. The other is vigorous propaganda for a new patriotism: not propaganda merely for a policy, but for a national renaissance and a change of social aim. The policy presupposes the renaissance — a popular will for rebirth.
The new patriotism and its policy (1938)
What is wanted is firmness with generosity, and freedom with responsibility: a people in training for a great task.
In propaganda we may have to learn a great deal from the Nazis — but we must emphasize at every point the profound difference between their purpose and ours. Democratic propaganda must stress the freedom of the individual and, inseparably, the responsibility of the individual. A true community is not a herd. Democracy must distinguish between essentials, on which common action is necessary, and non-essentials, in which variety and experiment should be welcomed.
We must stress equality of opportunity, and appeal confidently to the English genius for democracy — the English spirit at its best. There is no harm in saying 'Up England', provided that Britain's message to the world is not domination but the building of a new community. We shall need new slogans and symbols, and should avoid the old labels as far as possible.
We must play upon patriotic emotions, but turn them toward a new object. Military glory should be reviled, not glorified; Britain should seek honour through her social and cultural example. Imperialism must be disparaged: its dangers exposed, its abuses brought to light, the public gradually weaned from traditional patriotism. And we must expose the faults of the present oligarchy — its lack of imagination, its traditionalism, its subservience to finance.
When the renaissance has become widespread, policy can follow. The oligarchy must be overthrown, and it will certainly resist. We should use constitutional means; but if democratic forces are attacked, they must fight and defend Parliament — and the armed forces must be infected with the new democratic and anti-imperial spirit.
There should be propaganda to the German people — ostensibly private at first, carried by aeroplanes, by smuggling and by broadcasting; its themes peace and anti-imperialism.
At home we need a defence scheme directed toward invulnerability rather than attack: shelters, fighting aeroplanes, prepared evacuation; London dissipated; food stores. At the same time we should reduce our 'attack forces' — battleships — and prepare for what may be called Plan B warfare.
We must abolish the Empire: immediate self-government for India, and for other politically advanced regions; for the Crown Colonies, trustees invited from the democratic powers. Finally, a democratic alliance — defensive only, and open to all willing to accept that purpose.
Reconstruction, and the immediate task (1938)
Britain should declare to the world that her armaments will be used strictly for defence within her own frontiers, and that she intends to abandon the Empire; then summon a world conference on imperial and economic questions — but self-government for India first.
At home, social reconstruction. Agriculture must be developed intensively — avoiding food duties by building a two-year food store; training schemes; the land nationalized. All the main productive forces should be nationalized in some form — but 'ware 'socialism'. Finance must be controlled. The Press and radio must be brought under public control, administered by semi-independent boards on the analogy of the law; the New Zealand scheme may offer suggestions.
Education requires an equally radical change. At present we have, in effect, two kinds: one for masters and another for slaves. Instead there should be state schools for all, somewhat as in France, educating for responsibility, initiative, individuality and the sense of community. And the unemployed should become pioneers of community.
What, then, is the immediate task? First, experts must work out the policy — this is already well under way. Secondly, and much more importantly, propaganda — the more difficult task. The aim must be a new patriotism directed toward a new internationalism. We must expect resistance from the Government and from the whole oligarchy — consider Mr Chamberlain's control of the cinemas. What is needed is a huge rank-and-file effort; and the universities must play their part.
Supplementary heads
[Editorial note: the final sheet is another verso of jottings, likewise unassignable — rendered as the notes leave them: heads, not conclusions.]
A few further heads remain. Idealists are apt to assume their own superiority. We must reckon with German national power, and with Russia. We must study the National Socialist control of trade, comparing the German and Italian systems. We must also consider what happens if the British Empire collapses.
Macmurray's work is relevant here. Our national assets must be understood in their economic origin. We must consider internationalism — and here one thinks of Japan — and infra-Commonwealth federalism.
There remains the mob problem: the proletariat, and the minimum — food and other necessities guaranteed. Young parents must be considered; there are the claims of men and of the race. And there remains the question of equal incomes — with no land privately held, and with adjustment for family needs and for clothes.